Location Privacy Preservation in Database-Driven Wireless Cognitive
  Networks Through Encrypted Probabilistic Data Structures by Grissa, Mohamed et al.
1Location Privacy Preservation in Database-driven
Wireless Cognitive Networks through Encrypted
Probabilistic Data Structures
Mohamed Grissa, Attila A. Yavuz, and Bechir Hamdaoui
Oregon State University, grissam,attila.yavuz,hamdaoui@oregonstate.edu
Abstract—In this paper, we propose new location privacy
preserving schemes for database-driven cognitive radio networks
(CRN s) that protect secondary users’ (SU s) location privacy
while allowing them to learn spectrum availability in their
vicinity. Our schemes harness probabilistic set membership data
structures to exploit the structured nature of spectrum databases
(DBs) and SU s’ queries. This enables us to create a compact
representation of DB that could be queried by SU s without
having to share their location with DB , thus guaranteeing their
location privacy. Our proposed schemes offer different cost-
performance characteristics. Our first scheme relies on a simple
yet powerful two-party protocol that achieves unconditional
security with a plausible communication overhead by making
DB send a compacted version of its content to SU which needs
only to query this data structure to learn spectrum availability.
Our second scheme achieves significantly lower communication
and computation overhead for SU s, but requires an additional
architectural entity which receives the compacted version of the
database and fetches the spectrum availability information in
lieu of SU s to alleviate the overhead on the latter. We show
that our schemes are secure, and also demonstrate that they
offer significant advantages over existing alternatives for various
performance and/or security metrics.
Index Terms—Database-driven spectrum availability, location
privacy preservation, cognitive radio networks, set membership
data structures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio networks (CRN s) have emerged as a key
technology for addressing the problem of spectrum utiliza-
tion inefficiency [2]–[8]. CRN s allow unlicensed users, also
referred to as secondary users (SU s), to access licensed
frequency bands opportunistically, so long as doing so does not
harm licensed users, also referred to as primary users (PU s).
In order to enable SU s to identify vacant frequency bands, also
called white spaces, the federal communications commission
(FCC ) has adopted two main approaches: spectrum sensing-
based approach and geo-location database-driven approach.
In the sensing-based approach [9], SU s themselves sense
the licensed channels to decide whether a channel is available
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prior to using it so as to avoid harming PU s. In the database-
driven approach, SU s rely on a geo-location database (DB )
to obtain channel availability information. For this, SU s are
required to be equipped with GPS devices so as to be able to
query DB on a regular basis using their exact locations. Upon
receipt of a query, DB returns to SU the list of available
channels in its vicinity, as well as the transmission parameters
that are to be used by SU . This database-driven approach has
advantages over the sensing-based approach. First, it pushes
the responsibility and complexity of complying with spectrum
policies to DB . Second, it eases the adoption of policy changes
by limiting updates to just a handful number of databases, as
opposed to updating large numbers of devices [10].
Companies, like Google and Microsoft, are selected by
FCC to administrate these geo-location databases, following
the guidelines provided by PAWS (Protocol to Access White-
Space) [10]. PAWS protocol defines guidelines and opera-
tional requirements for both the spectrum database and the
SU s querying it. These requirements include: SU s need to
be equipped with geo-location capabilities, SU s must query
DB with their specific location to check channel availability
before starting their transmissions, DB must register SU s and
manage their access to the spectrum, DB must respond to
SU s’ queries with the list of available channels in their vicinity
along with the appropriate transmission parameters.
Despite their effectiveness in improving spectrum utilization
efficiency, database-driven CRN s suffer from serious security
and privacy threats. The disclosure of location privacy of
SU s has been one of such threats to SU s when it comes
to obtaining spectrum availability from DBs. This is simply
because SU s have to share their locations with DB to learn
about spectrum availability. The fine-grained location, when
combined with publicly available information, can lead to
even greater private information leakage. For example, it can
be used to infer private information like shopping patterns,
preferences, behavior and beliefs, etc. [11]. Being aware of
such potential privacy threats, SU s may refuse to rely on
DB for spectrum availability information. Therefore, there
is a critical need for location-privacy preserving schemes for
database-driven spectrum access.
A. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose two location privacy-preserving
schemes for database-driven CRN s with different perfor-
mance and architectural benefits. The first scheme, location
privacy in database-driven CRNs (LPDB ), provides optimal
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2location privacy to SU s within DB ’s coverage area by lever-
aging set membership data structures (used to test whether
an element is a member of a set) to construct a compact
version of DB . The second scheme, LPDB with two servers
(LPDBQS ), minimizes the overhead at SU ’s side at the cost
of deploying an additional entity in the network. The cost-
performance tradeoff gives more options to system designers
to decide which topology and which approach is more suitable
to their specific requirements.
Both approaches exploit two important facts: (i) Spectrum
databases are highly structured [10]; and (ii) SU s queries
contain always the same device-specific characteristics (e.g.,
device type, antenna hight, frequency range, etc.) [10]. The
highly structured property of the database refers to the fact
that DB ’s structure is usually agreed upon by the FCC and
the database administrators, like Google, Microsoft, etc, and
that the queries and messages exchanged by DB and SU s
have a specific format in terms of what data they include.
This well-defined information is available to both database
administrators and SU s which allows them to have an idea
on what kind of data the other party will include in its
query/response, and also to compact both DB ’s content and
the queries using probabilistic data structures. In fact, and
as recommended by the PAWS standard, the database should
always reply to SU s with a set of predetermined information.
This allows DB to compact its content to include only this
information, which significantly reduces queried data sizes,
and enables SU s to emulate DB ’s response when querying
the probabilistic data structure as we show next.
A desirable property of our schemes is their simplicity that
is expected to facilitate their applicability in real-life applica-
tions. Our proposed schemes offer various cost-performance
trade-offs that can meet the requirements of different applica-
tions. We study these tradeoffs and show that high privacy and
better performance for SU s’ can be achieved, but at the cost
of deploying an additional architectural entity in the system.
We show that our proposed schemes are secure and more
efficient than their existing counterparts. In addition, we study
the impact of system parameters on the performances of our
proposed schemes, and compare them against those obtained
via existing approaches.
Compared to our preliminary work [1], this paper provides:
(i) A new scheme, LPDBQS , with multiple deployment
scenarios, that improves the overhead on SU s’ side by re-
lying on an extra architectural entity; (ii) An improvement
to our previously proposed scheme, LPDB , by incorporating
spectrum sensing to reduce the impact of the false positive
rate of the used set membership data structure on spectrum
availability information’s accuracy; (iii) A detailed security
analysis of the proposed schemes; and (iv) More detailed
performance analysis with more evaluation metrics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We
discuss related work in Section II. We present our system
and threat models along with our security assumptions in
Section III. Section IV provides a brief overview of the
set membership data structure that we use in this paper. In
Section V-A, we present our first scheme LPDB . We describe
our second scheme LPDBQS in Section V-B. We evaluate
and analyze the performance of the proposed schemes in
Section VII, and conclude our work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Despite its importance, the location privacy issue in CRN s
only recently gained interest from the research commu-
nity [12]. Some works focused on addressing this issue in
the context of collaborative spectrum sensing [13]–[17] while
others focused on addressing it in the context of dynamic
spectrum auction [18]. However, these works are not within
the scope of this paper as we focus on the location privacy
issue in database-driven CRN s.
Protecting SU s’ location privacy in database-driven CRN s
is a very challenging task, since SU s are required to provide
their physical locations to DB in order for them to be
able to learn about spectrum opportunities in their vicinities.
Recently developed techniques mostly adopt either the k-
anonymity [19], Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [20], or
differential privacy [21] concepts. However, direct adaptation
of such concepts yield either insecure or extremely costly re-
sults. For instance, k-anonymity guarantees that SU ’s location
is indistinguishable among a set of k points, which could be
achieved through the use of dummy locations by generating
k − 1 properly selected dummy points, and performing k
queries to DB using both the real and dummy locations. For
example, Zhang et al. [22] rely on this concept to make each
SU query DB by sending a square cloak region that includes
its actual location. Their approach makes a tradeoff between
providing high location privacy and maximizing some utility,
which makes it suffer from the fact that achieving a high
location privacy level results in a decrease in spectrum utility.
PIR, on the other hand, allows a client to obtain infor-
mation from a database while preventing the database from
learning which data is being retrieved. Several approaches
have used this approach. For instance, Gao et al. [23] propose
a PIR-based approach, termed PriSpectrum , that relies on
the PIR scheme of Trostle et al. [24] to defend against
a newly identified attack that exploits spectrum utilization
pattern to localize SU s. Troja et al. [25], [26] propose two
other PIR-based approaches that try to minimize the num-
ber of PIR queries by either allowing SU s to share their
availability information with other SU s [25] or by exploiting
trajectory information to make SU s retrieve information for
their current and future positions in the same query [26].
Despite their merit in providing location privacy to SU s these
PIR-based approaches incur high overhead especially in terms
of computation.
Using differential privacy, Zhang et al. [27] rely on the
-geo-indistinguishability mechanism [28] to make SU s ob-
fuscate their location. However, such a mechanism introduces
noise to SU ’s location which may impact the accuracy of the
spectrum availability information retrieved.
There have also been other privacy-enhancing technologies
(PETs) that are not specific to CRN s but are designed to
enable private queries over a database in general. However,
many of these PETs are designed for applications that do not fit
in the context of CRN s. For instance, oblivious random access
3memory (ORAM) [29] aims to enable a user to outsource its
encrypted data to a database and to offer him/her the possibil-
ity to access this data while hiding the access patterns from the
database [12]. Searchable symmetric encryption [30] is another
PET that is largely deployed to privately outsource one’s data
to another party while maintaining the ability to selectively
search over it [12]. These PETs are designed for protecting
queries and searches over data that is outsourced to a database,
which is completely different from the CRN scenario where
the queried data belong to the database itself.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS
A. Database-driven CRN Model
We first consider a CRN that consists of a set of SU s
and a geo-location database (DB ). SU s are assumed to be
enabled with GPS and spectrum sensing capabilities, and to
have access to DB to obtain spectrum availability information
within its operation area. To learn about spectrum availability,
a SU queries DB by including its location and its device
characteristics. DB responds with a list of available channels
at the specified location and a set of parameters for transmis-
sion over those channels. SU then selects and uses one of
the returned channels. While using the channel, SU needs to
recheck its availability on a daily basis or whenever it changes
its location by 100 meters as mandated by PAWS [10].
We then investigate incorporating a third entity to the
network along with DB and SU s. This entity, referred to
as query server (QS ), has a dedicated high throughput link
with DB . QS is used to guarantee computational location
privacy while reducing the computational and communication
overhead especially on SU s’ side.
B. Security Model and Assumptions
DB and QS are assumed to be honest but curious. That
is, DB and QS follow the protocol honestly but may try to
infer information on the input of other parties beyond what
the output of the protocol reveals. Specifically, our objective
is to prevent these two entities from learning SU s’ location.
Therefore, our security assumptions are as follows:
Security Assumption 1. DB and QS do not modify the
integrity of their input. That is, (i) DB does not maliciously
change SU ’s query’s content; (ii) QS does not modify the
input that it receives from DB or SU .
Security Assumption 2. DB and QS do not collude with
each other to infer the location of SU s from their queries.
We further assume that the communication between dif-
ferent entities is secured by a cryptographic protocol like
TLS [31] as suggested by PAWS [10]. This eliminates the risk
of an adversary trying to eavesdrop the communication.
IV. SET MEMBERSHIP DATA STRUCTURES
Our proposed privacy-preserving schemes utilize set mem-
bership data structures to exploit the highly structured prop-
erty of DB . There are several data structures that are designed
Figure 1: Cuckoo Filter: 2 hashes per item, 8 buckets each
containing 4 entries
for set membership tests, e.g. bloom filter [32], cuckoo fil-
ter [33], etc. However, in this paper, we opt for cuckoo filter
as the building block of our schemes. We use cuckoo filter
to construct a compact representation of the spectrum geo-
location database as explained in Sections V-A & V-B. What
motivates our choice is that cuckoo filter offers the highest
space efficiency among its current well known alternatives,
such as bloom filters. Besides, it has been proven to be
more efficient than these alternatives especially for large sets.
Finally, the cuckoo filter enjoys fast Lookup and Insert
operations that are beneficial to our schemes.
A cuckoo filter [33] uses cuckoo hashing [34] and is
designed to serve applications that need to store a large number
of items while targeting low false positive rates and requiring
storage space smaller than that required by bloom filters. A
false positive occurs when the membership test returns that
an item exists in the cuckoo filter (i.e., belongs to the set)
while it actually does not. A false negative, on the other
hand, occurs when the membership test returns that an item
does not exist while it actually exists. In cuckoo filters, false
positives are possible, but false negatives are not, and the target
false positive rate, denoted throughout this paper by , can be
controlled but has a direct impact on the filter’s size. Figure 1
shows an example of a cuckoo filter that uses two hashes per
item and contains 8 buckets each with 4 entries.
A cuckoo filter has mainly two functions: An Insert
function that stores items in the filter, and a Lookup function
that checks whether an item exists in the filter. In the Insert
operation, cuckoo filter stores a fingerprint f of each item
x, as opposed to storing the item itself. The space cost, in
bits, of storing one item in the cuckoo filter using the Insert
function depends on the target false positive rate  and is given
by (log2(1/)+ log2(2β))/α where α is the load factor of the
filter which defines its maximum capacity, and β is the number
of entries/slots per bucket. Once the maximum feasible, α,
is reached, insertions are likely to fail, and hence, the filter
must expand in order to store more items [33]. The Lookup
operation is performed by first computing a fingerprint of
the desired item and two indexes, representing the potential
locations (or buckets) of this item in the filter, and then
checking whether these two locations contain the item.
4V. PROPOSED SCHEMES
In this section, we describe our proposed schemes. The first
scheme, LPDB , is simple as it involves only two parties,
SU s and DB , and provides unconditional location privacy to
SU s within the coverage area of DB . The second scheme,
LPDBQS , offers computational privacy with a significantly
reduced overhead on SU s’ side compared to LPDB , but at
the cost of introducing an extra architectural entity.
Since we are unable to access the actual spectrum database,
we relied on two sources to have an estimate of this structure:
First, we have relied on the recommendation of the PAWS
standard [10], which defines the interaction between SU s and
DB and what information they should exchange. Second, we
used graphical web interfaces provided to the public by white
space database operators like Google [35], Microsoft [36],
iconectiv [37], etc. These web interfaces comply with PAWS
recommendation and allow an interested user to specify a
location of interest and learn spectrum availability in that
location to emulate the interaction between a SU and DB in
real world. While the purpose of these interfaces was initially
to provide a working platform as a showcase for FCC to
acquire approval for operating spectrum database, we believe
it has enough information to enable us to estimate the structure
of the database and SU s’ queries.
As required by PAWS, SU s must be registered with DB to
be able to query it for spectrum availability. Registered
SU starts by sending an initialization query to DB which
replies by informing the SU of specific parameterized-rule
values. These parameters include time periods beyond which
the SU must update its available-spectrum data, and max-
imum location change before needing to query DB again.
Afterwards, SU queries DB with an available spectrum query
which contains its geolocation, device identifier, capabilities
(to limit DB ’s response to only compatible channels) and
antenna characteristics (e.g. antenna height and type). DB then
replies with the set of available channels in the SU ’s location
along with permissible power levels for each channel.
Based on these interactions between SU and DB , which
we learned from PAWS and the database web interfaces, we
estimate the structure of DB to be as illustrated in Table I.
Each row corresponds to a different combination of location
pairs (locX ,locY ) and channel chn . One location may contain
several available channels at the same time. Note that even if
the real structure deviates from the one illustrated in Table I
(e.g. more/different attributes, more tables, etc), our schemes
can be adapted to the new structure of both the queries and the
database by designing or using a different probabilistic data
structure(s). Also, even in this case, the PAWS standard re-
quires that DB always replies to spectrum availability queries
with a set of predetermined values that have to be in the
database no matter what structure it has. In that case, DB only
needs to insert these values in the cuckoo filter and this could
be done independently from the database structure.
A. LPDB
In this section, we describe our basic scheme, which is
referred to as location privacy in database-driven CRN s
TABLE I: Simplified example of DB ’s structure
locX locY ts chn avl par1 · · · parn
row1 locX 1 locY 1 t chn1 0 par11 · · · parn1
row2 locX 1 locY 1 t chn2 1 par12 · · · parn2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
row i locX 2 locY 2 t chn1 1 par1i · · · parni
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
rowr locX r locY r t chn1 0 par1r · · · parnr
avl = 1 means chn is available and avl = 0 means chn is not available.
(LPDB ). The novelty of LPDB lies in the use of set mem-
bership data structures to construct a compact (space efficient)
representation of DB that can be sent to querying SU s to
inform them about spectrum availability.
In our scheme, instead of sending its location, a SU sends
only its characteristics (e.g., its device type, its antenna type,
etc.), as specified by PAWS [10], to DB , which then uses them
to retrieve the corresponding entries in all possible locations.
DB then puts these entries in a cuckoo filter and sends it to
SU . Upon receiving this filter, SU constructs a query that
includes its characteristic information, its location, and one of
the possible channels with its associated parameters. SU then
looks up this query in the received cuckoo filter to see whether
that channel is available in its current location.
Parameters that are inserted in the response of DB may
include the location, time stamps, the available channels, and
the transmission power to be considered when using those
channels. SU ’s characteristics and DB parameters could be
agreed upon beforehand between DB and SU s to make sure
that SU queries the cuckoo filter with the right parameters.
The proposed LPDB scheme is illustrated in Algorithm 1,
and briefly described as follows: First, each SU starts by
constructing query to be sent to DB by including a set of
characteristics, which are specific to the querying device, along
with a time stamp ts . DB then retrieves the entries that corre-
spond to query and constructs a cuckoo filter CF (which could
be done offline). Since DB contains availability status for
each channel in each location, the number of entries satisfying
query will still be huge and one way to further reduce it is
to retrieve only the information about available channels and
ignore the other ones. Afterwards, DB concatenates the data
in each row to construct xj as illustrated in Step 6, inserts it
to CF and sends CF to SU .
SU constructs a string y by concatenating its location
coordinates with a combination of one channel and its possible
transmission parameters and tries to find whether y exists
in CF by using the Lookup operation of CF . SU keeps
changing the channel and the associated parameters until it
finds the string y in CF or until SU tries all possible channels.
Note that, depending on the false positive rate  of CF , even
if the Lookup operation returns True it does not necessarily
mean that the specified channel is available. Setting  to be
very small makes the probability of having such a scenario
very small, thus reduces the risk of using a busy channel,
but this cannot be done without increasing the size of CF .
To further reduce the risk of falling into this case, we have
5also included an additional sensing step to confirm the query’s
result and give more accurate information about the status of
the channel of interest. If SU finds y in CF , then it needs to
sense the specific channel found in y to confirm its availability.
SU can conclude that this channel is free and thus can use it
only if the sensing result coincides with CF ’s response.
If, after trying all possible combinations, SU does not find y
in CF , this means that no channel is available in the specified
location as cuckoo filters do not incur any false negatives.
Algorithm 1 LPDB Algorithm
1: SU queries DB with query ← f(char , ts);
2: DB retrieves resp containing r entries satisfying query ;
3: DB constructs CF ;
4: for j = 1, . . . , r do
5: if avl j = 1 then
6: x j ← (locX j‖locY j‖chn‖ts‖ . . .);
7: DB inserts x j into CF : CF .Insert(x j);
8: DB sends CF to SU ;
9: SU initializes decision ← Channel is busy
10: for all possible combinations of par do
11: SU computes y ← (locX ‖locY ‖chni‖ts‖ . . . ‖parn);
12: if CF .Lookup(y) then
13: SU senses chn;
14: if Sensing(chn)← available then
15: decision ← chn is available; break;
return decision
When the size of DB is not large, then LPDB works well
(as will be shown Section VII) by providing unconditional
privacy with reasonably small amounts of overhead. However,
a scalability issue may arise when the location resolution is
very small (resolution used in DB could be as small as 50
meters) and/or the area covered by DB is large (e.g. at the
scale of a country). In this case, the number of locations, and
thus the number of entries in DB , can be large, and then
even after relying on the cuckoo filter, the size of the data to
be transmitted may still be impractical (e.g. in the order of
gigabytes). This depends on the desired resolution and DB ’s
covered area. Next, we present a discussion about a possible
way to deal with this scalability issue in the case of a very
large DB .
Performance-privacy tradeoff: As discussed before,
LPDB may suffer from a scalability issue when the size
of DB ’s coverage area is very large. We can address this
issue through the following observation. When the covered
area is large and/or the location resolution is small, allowing
DB to learn one of SU ’s coordinates can drastically reduce
the number of entries that DB retrieves. This leads to
considerably reduce the size of CF to be transmitted, thus
making the approach scalable. Interestingly, in the case of
large areas, revealing one of SU ’s coordinates does not make
it any easier for DB to infer SU ’s location. To illustrate this,
let’s for example assume that DB covers the entire surface
of the United States, as shown in Figure 2. Allowing DB to
learn one coordinate (e.g the latitude) means that it can only
learn that SU is located somewhere on the blue line that
spans the latitude of the whole country. But since DB does
not know the longitude of SU , then knowing the latitude only
does not offer any practical information about SU ’s location.
Figure 2: Location Leakage
This, as shown in Section VII-A, drastically reduces the
size of CF transmitted by DB at the cost of loosing the
unconditional location privacy of SU s. However, when the
coverage area of DB is large, even revealing one of the co-
ordinates still achieves high location privacy of SU s. Indeed,
since databases (like those managed by Microsoft and Google)
may cover an entire nation of the size of the United States,
the revealed information is not sufficient to localize SU , yet,
this reduces our scheme’s overhead substantially. The example
of the United States in Figure 2 shows that our scheme
can offer high privacy even when one of the coordinates is
revealed. Throughout, we refer to this variant of our scheme
as LPDB with leakage.
It is worth reiterating that when the covered area is not too
large, then the size of the cuckoo filter is practical and there
is no need to reveal one of SU ’s coordinates. In this case,
our scheme, LPDB , provides unconditional privacy without
incurring much overhead. The system regulator can decide
about which approach to follow depending on the system
constraints and the size DB ’s covered area.
B. LPDBQS
In this section, we propose a new scheme, LPDBQS , which
offers better performance at SU s’ side than that of LPDB .
This comes at the cost of deploying an additional entity,
referred to as query server (QS ), and having a computational
security as opposed to unconditional. QS is introduced to
handle SU s’ queries instead of DB itself, which prevents
DB from learning information related to SU s’ location in-
formation. QS learns nothing but secure messages sent by
SU s to check the availability of a specific channel.
• Intuition: We introduce QS to avoid sending CF ,
which might be large, to SU . Instead, CF , that contains
HMAC secure entries inserted by DB using a secret key
provided by SU , is sent to QS through a high throughput
link pre-established with DB . SU just needs to query, using
HMAC messages, QS which looks for its queries in CF .
6Using HMAC , SU can hide the content of the query string,
which includes its location information, among others, from
QS which ignores the key used to construct the hashed query
and the CF . This not only prevents QS from learning the
query’s content but also the entry that matches it in the filter.
As most of the computation and communication overhead
are incurred by both DB and QS , this scheme is the most
efficient in terms of overhead incurred by SU s. LPDBQS is
summarized in Algorithm 2 and described in the following.
Algorithm 2 LPDBQS Algorithm
1: SU queries DB with query ← f(k, char , ts);
2: DB retrieves resp containing r entries satisfying char ;
3: DB constructs CF k;
4: for j = 1, . . . , r do
5: if avl j = 1 then
6: x j ← (locX j‖locY j‖ts‖ . . . ‖row j(c));
7: CF k.InsertHMACk(x j);
8: DB sends CF k to QS over a high throughput link;
9: SU initializes decision ← Channel is busy
10: for all possible combinations of par do
11: SU computes y ← (locX ‖locY ‖chn‖ts‖ . . . ‖parn);
12: SU computes yk ← HMAC k(y) and sends it to QS ;
13: QS looks up for yk in CF k using Lookup;
14: if CF k.Lookup(yk) then
15: SU senses chn;
16: if Sensing(chn)← available then
17: decision ← chn is available; break;
return decision
First, SU starts by sending a secret key k, pre-established
beforehand, along with its device characteristics to DB .
DB then retrieves only the entries that have available channels
and that also comply with the device characteristics of the
querying SU . Afterwards, DB constructs a cuckoo filter CF k
and inserts into it the entries retrieved in the previous step as
shown in Steps 4-7. InsertHMACk , in Step 7, is a modified
version of the Insert procedure, where the fingerprint is
replaced by an HMAC k function. DB uses HMAC k with
the secret key k, provided by SU , to construct hashed entries
and insert them to CF k. DB then sends CF k to QS via the
high speed link that connects DB to QS .
SU constructs a string y by concatenating its location
coordinates with a combination of one channel and its possible
transmission parameters. Subsequently, SU hashes y using
an HMAC with the secret key k and sends the new value
yk to QS to find out whether CF k of QS contains yk. If
the query’s combination is found in CF k, then SU needs to
take one further step: It senses the channel that was included
in the query. If the result of the sensing complies with the
outcome of the Lookup operation in CF k, then SU can
conclude that this channel is available and, thus, it can use
it for its future transmissions. In this case, SU can stop
querying QS . The sensing operation is added to confirm the
outcome of querying the cuckoo filter and overcome the risk
of falling into the case of a false positive result that would
eventually make SU interfere with primary transmissions. In
case the sensing result is different from the outcome of the
Lookup operation, then SU keeps changing the channel and
the associated parameters until QS finds yk in CF k or until
SU tries all possible channels and combinations.
This scheme considerably reduces the overhead perceived
by SU s, as much of the computation is performed offline by
DB , and SU s do not need to download the cuckoo filters
which are only sent to QS over a high throughput link.
If DB knows the possible device characteristics of the
querying SU s, this can help to further reduce the incurred
overhead. Indeed, DB can pre-compute several cuckoo filters
for each possible combination of potential device parameters
offline by relying on a set of secret keys K = {k1, . . . , kz} that
it generated beforehand. For each combination of parameters,
DB constructs multiple CF k with different keys from K to
make sure that each SU uses a different filter. SU s are not
required to generate their own keys as in the previous variant.
Whenever a SU queries DB for spectrum opportunities,
DB shares a secret key k with it and sends the corresponding
CF k to QS . SU uses k to construct its hashed strings and
query CF k of QS just like in Algorithm 2.
Leveraging a Secure Hardware: As long as DB and QS do
not collude, as stated in Security Assumption 2, neither of
them can infer the coordinates of SU s from the keyed one-way
function output. To mitigate the non-collusion requirement
between FC and QS , LPDBQS could be implemented in
a slightly different way by relying on a secure hardware
(e.g., a secure co-processor or a trusted platform module)
that can perform cryptographic operations without exposing its
embedded private key. This hardware can be deployed inside
DB itself and play the role of QS . Such a high-end secure
hardware is physically shielded from penetration [38], and
any tampering from the adversary, potentially DB , triggers
the automatic erasure of sensitive memory areas containing
critical secrets [39]. When a secure hardware meets the FIPS
140-2 level 4 [40] physical security requirements, it becomes
infeasible for FC to tamper with the operations executed by
this hardware. DB sends the cuckoo filters to this hardware,
and SU s have to query this hardware to learn about spectrum
availabilities.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of our proposed
schemes LPDB and LPDBQS .
Theorem 1. Under Security Assumptions 1 and 2, LPDB does
not leak any information on SU s’ location.
Proof: We construct a history listH of each entity’s knowledge
about SU s’ information during the execution of LPDB .
SU . A SU cannot learn anything about other SU s infor-
mation nor the filters {CF i,t}n−1,tfi=1,t=t0 that they receive from
DB as the communication between each SU and DB is
secured, i.e. HSU = ∅. Note that, even if, a SU would learn
the filters of other SU s, i.e. HSU = {CF i,t}n−1,tfi=1,t=t0 , HSU
includes no information about SU s’ location.
DB . In Step 1 of Algorithm 1, DB learns HDB = {char}ni=1
which contains the characteristics of the querying SU s. HDB
7may include information like frequency ranges in which
SU can operate, antenna characteristics, etc. This information
is not related to the querying SU s’ location. This shows
that the knowledge that DB gains during the execution of
LPDB does not allow it to infer SU s’ location when they
try to learn about spectrum opportunities. LPDB offers an
unconditional privacy in the sense that DB ’s knowledge about
SU s’ location, during the execution of LPDB , does not in-
crease compared to its initial knowledge, which is necessarily
the coverage area of DB . 
Theorem 2. Under Security Assumptions 1 and 2
LPDBQS does not leak any information about SU s’
location beyond κ−HMAC secure values.
Proof: We construct a history list of each entity’s knowledge
during the execution of LPDBQS .
SU . As the communication between different entities is
secured, SU s cannot learn any information about the com-
municated information of other entities, i.e. HSU = ∅.
DB . In Line 1 of Algorithm 2, DB learns
HDB = {ki,t, char i, tst}n,tfi=0,t=t0 . Obviously, SU s’ secret
keys {ki,t}n,tfi=0,t=t0 and timestamp values {tst}
tf
t=t0 cannot
leak any information about SU s’ location since these values
are not correlated to their physical location. Similarly, their
characteristics {char i}ni=1 contain information about SU s’
devices capabilities, like their possible transmit powers,
antennas height, etc, which cannot be used to localize them.
This proves that DB ’s knowledge about SU s’ location during
the execution of LPDBQS does not differ from its initial
knowledge; i.e. that SU s are within DB ’s covered area.
QS . As indicated in Lines 8 & 12 of Algorithm 2, the
only information that QS can learn during the execution of
LPDBQS , is HQS = {yki,t ,CF ki,t}n,tfi=1,t=t0 . {yki,t}
n,tf
i=1,t=t0
are as secure as HMAC . The elements of {CF ki,t}n,tfi=1,t=t0 are
computed using a pseudo random function (as an HMAC is
also a pseudo random function) with SU s’ secret keys
{ki,t}n,tfi=1,t=t0 , where {ki,t}
n,tf
i=1,t=t0
$← {0, 1}κ and κ is
the security level. {yki,t}n,tfi=1,t=t0 are independent from each
other. The same applies to {CF ki,t}n,tfi=1,t=t0 . Each query from
{yki,t}n,tfi=1,t=t0 has a corresponding HMAC key, which means
that even for the same SU querying the same information,
there will be randomly independent and uniformly distributed
outputs generated by DB and SU s. Since only SU s and
DB know the keys {ki,t}n,tfi=1,t=t0 and that these keys are
updated for every query made by SU s, QS cannot learn any
information about SU s’ location as long as it does not collude
with DB as stated in Security Assumption 2. Correlating
queries {yki,t}n,tfi=1,t=t0 to SU s’ physical location is equivalent
to breaking the underlying HMAC or PRF , which is of
probability 1/2κ.
We can conclude that LPDBQS is as secure as the under-
lying HMAC . 
VII. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
schemes. We consider that DB ’s covered area is modeled as a
√
m×√m grid that contains m cells each represented by one
location pair (locX ,locY ) in DB . We use the efficient cuckoo
filter implementation provided in [41] for our performance
analysis with a very small false positive rate  = 10−8 and
a load factor α = 0.95. In addition, since personal/portable
TVBD devices of SU s can only transmit on available chan-
nels in the frequency bands 512 − 608 MHz (TV channels
21−36) and 614-698 MHz (TV channels 38−51), this means
that users can only access 31 white-space TV band channels
in a dynamic spectrum access manner [42]. Therefore, in our
evaluation we set the number of TV channels s = 31.
Since in practice, at a given time, only a percentage of DB ’s
entries contains available channels, we have ran an experiment
to learn what a realistic value of this percentage might be.
We denote this percentage (averaged over time and space) as
%. We have used the Microsoft online white spaces database
application [36] to identify and measure % by monitoring
8 different US locations (Portland, San Faransico, Houston,
Miami, Seattle, Boston, New York and Salt Lake City) for
few days with an interval between successive measurements
of 3 hours. Our measurements show that % is about 6.8%.
Not only does this experiment allow us to evaluate the
communication overhead, but also the computational overhead,
especially from the database side since both overheads are
linear functions of the percentage % as we show in Table II.
There are several factors that influence the performance
of both LPDB and LPDBQS . One of these factors is
the percentage % which has a significant influence on the
performance of our schemes as we show in Table II and
Figure 6. Also, the number of cells in the grid covered by
DB has a direct impact on the size of DB , and thus on
the communication and computational overheads of DB as
highlighted in Table II and Figures 3 and 5a. In fact, as the
number of cells increases, the size of DB increases and so
does the computational complexity of constructing the cuckoo
filter. In addition, the false positive rate, , has an impact on the
cost of storing one record in the cuckoo filter and subsequently
on the communication overhead as we illustrate and discuss in
Figure 4 and Table II. Finally, the fraction of positive queries,
fp, can impact the lookup performance as we show and discuss
in Figure 7a. We discuss these factors in more details in the
next section.
Next, we also compare our schemes with respect to existing
approaches in terms of (i) communication and computational
overhead, and (ii) location privacy. Since the schemes in [22],
[27] try to achieve a different goal, which is the mutual loca-
tion privacy between SU s and PU s, we do not include them
in our overhead analysis. Note that, since the PIR protocol
used in [25] has not been specified, we use the protocol
proposed by Trostle et al. [24] used in PriSpectrum [23] in
our performance comparison.
A. Communication and Computation Overhead
1) Communication Overhead: We provide analytical ex-
pressions of the communication overhead of these schemes
in Table II. For LPDB , we provide two expressions of the
overhead with respect to two scenarios: (i) when SU s do not
8TABLE II: Communication and computation overhead of proposed and existent schemes
Scheme Communication
Computation
DB SU QP
LPDB σquery + % · s ·m · (log2(1/) + log2(2β))/α % · s ·m · insert s · (Hash+ lookup) -
LPDB w/ leakage σquery + % · s ·
√
m · (log2(1/) + log2(2β))/α % · s ·
√
m · insert s · (Hash+ lookup) -
PriSpectrum [23] (2
√
m + 3)dlog pe O(m) ·Mulp 4√m ·Mulp -
LPDBQS σquery + % · s ·m · (log2(1/) + log2(2β))/α+ s · σHMAC % · s ·m · insert s ·HMAC s · lookup
Troja et al [26] (2 + d) · log2 N O(m) ·Mulp 4
√
m · v ·Mulp -
Troja et al [25] ng · b · log2 q + (2
√
m + 3)dlog pe O(m) ·Mulp ng · b · (2Expp+Mulp) + 4
√
m ·Mulp -
Variables: insert and lookup denote the cost of one Insert and Lookup operations in the Cuckoo Filter. β is the number of entries in a bucket of the cuckoo filter. p is a
large prime used in the blinding factor of PriSpectrum , q is a large prime used in [25], b denotes the number of bits that an SU shares with other SU s in [25], ng is the
number of SU s within a same group in [25], v is the size of a block in DB [26], and d is the umber of DB segments in [26]. Mulp and Expp denote a modular
multiplication and a modular exponentiation operations over modulus p. σu denotes the amount of data exchanged during a process u, where u ∈ {query,HMAC}.
reveal one of their coordinates, (ii) when one of the coordinates
is revealed by SU s. In both scenarios the data transmitted
consist basically of query , sent by SU , and the response of
DB to it. The size of the response generated by DB depends
on the number of entries in DB that satisfy query and on
the space needed to store each of these entities in CF . The
number of entries for LPDB is given by % · s ·m and reduces
to % · s · √m when one of the coordinates is revealed by
SU . s · m and s · √m provide the number of entries in
DB that satisfy the query of SU for both scenarios. % gives the
percentage of those entries with available channels. LPDBQS
incurs a slightly higher communication overhead than LPDB
from a system point of view, as SU needs to additionally
send a maximum of s ·σHMAC to QS . However, most of this
overhead is incurred between DB and QS as SU s do not have
to download CF s from DB anymore. For illustration purpose,
we plot in Figure 3 the system communication overhead of the
different schemes using the expressions established in Table II.
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Figure 3: Communication Overhead
As shown in Figure 3, and as expected, LPDB is clearly
more expensive than the other schemes in terms of commu-
nication overhead even when %, determined experimentally,
is equal to 6.8%. However, revealing one of the coordinates
brings a huge gain and makes our scheme even better than
existing approaches, yet without compromising the location
privacy. LPDBQS has almost the same communication over-
head as LPDB but with the difference that most of this
overhead is incurred between DB and QS .
We study also the impact of varying the target false positive
rate, , on the cost of inserting one record in the CF in bits as
illustrated in Figure 4. This has a direct impact on the size of
the filter and thus the communication overhead of our schemes.
We do this for multiple values of β, which is the number of
slots per bucket in the cuckoo filter. As shown in Figure 4,
targeting a smaller value of  costs more bits to store an item
in the filter and subsequently increases the communication
overhead. Increasing the value of β will require more bits per
item to achieve the same target  as illustrated in the Figure.
However, cuckoo filter still achieves significantly better than
other probabilistic data structures like space-optimized bloom
filter as shown in the Figure, which again justifies our choice
of the cuckoo filter technique.
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2) Computational Overhead: We also investigate the effi-
ciency of our proposed schemes in terms of their computa-
tional overhead. We evaluate the computation required at each
entity separately, and we provide the corresponding analytical
expression of the overhead as shown in Table II. Again we
provide two estimated costs for both scenarios of LPDB .
The computation of DB is given in terms of the number of
insertions it has to perform into CF . This depends on the
number of DB entries that comply with query considering
only the available channels. This number is equal to % ·s ·m in
LPDB and reduces to % · s · √m in LPDB with leakage. For
the computational cost at the SU ’s side, LPDB ’s overhead
depends solely on the number of possible channels, s , and
the cost of one Hash and one Lookup operations, as shown
in Table II. One of the reasons that motivated our use of the
cuckoo filter, as we mentioned earlier, is that it is characterized
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Figure 5: Computation Comparison
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Figure 6: Impact of varying %.
by an extremely fast Lookup operation. This allows SU s to
check whether a specific combination, y , exists in the filter,
i.e. whether channel is available, very efficiently. LPDB ’s
overhead at SU ’s side does not depend on the size of DB since
any lookup query to CF always reads a fixed number of
buckets (at most two) [33], which makes our scheme more
scalable than existing approaches in terms of computation
when the size of DB increases. In LPDBQS , DB performs
the same computation as in LPDB . The Lookup operations
on CF are now outsourced to QS instead of SU s and
QS needs to perform a maximum of s · lookup for every
querying SU , which is very fast to perform as we mentioned
earlier. Every SU needs to only construct HMAC -strings
{ykt}tft=t0 which could be done extremely quickly and could
even be precomputed. Note that the PIR-based approaches
have similar cost on DB ’s side, since in any PIR scheme, the
server is destined to have O(m) computation [24].
For illustration purpose, we plot in Figure 5 the computa-
tional overhead incurred by each SU and DB , in the different
schemes using the expressions established in Table II.
Our schemes are much more efficient than existing ap-
proaches at both DB and SU sides as shown in Figures 5a
& 5b. The gap keeps increasing considerably as the number
of cells (i.e., the size of DB ) increases. This is due to the
fact that these approaches’ cost is dominated by an increasing
number of modular multiplications which are very expensive
compared to the Insert and Lookup operations of the cuckoo
filter in our schemes.
We also evaluate the impact of other parameters on the
overhead perceived by both SU s and DB as shown in Fig-
ure 7. First, in Figure 7a, we illustrate the variation of the
throughput of the lookup operations in million operations per
second (MOPS) in a cuckoo filter of size 112MB as a function
of the fraction of positive queries fp, i.e. queries for items that
actually exist in the filter. This clearly shows the efficiency of
the lookup operations that SU or QS has to perform to check
availability information within CF . CF always fetches two
buckets and thus achieves about the same performance when
the queries are 100% positive or 100% negative and drops
when fp = 50% for which the CPU’s branch prediction is
least accurate [33].
We also assess the insertion throughput that DB experiences
to construct the CF as a function of the load factor α as
shown in Figure 7b. As opposed to the lookup throughput
shown in Figure 7a, CF has a decreasing insert throughput
when it is more filled (though their overall construction speed
is still high). This is mainly due to the fact that CF may have
to move a sequence of existing fingerprints recursively before
successfully inserting a new item, and this process becomes
more expensive when the load factor grows higher [33].
3) Impact of varying the percentage % of entries with
available channels: We also study the impact of % on the
overhead incurred by our schemes. For this, we plot in Figure 6
the communication and the system computational overheads
for different values of %. We plot only LPDB and LPDB with
leakage as LPDBQS has almost the same overhead as LPDB .
As shown in Figure 6, both overheads behave similarly in the
way that decreasing % when one of the coordinates is revealed
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Figure 7: 7a. Lookup performance when a filter achieves its capacity. 7b. Insertion throughput for different load factors α.
doesn’t impact much our scheme. LPDB w/ Leakage has the
smallest overhead compared to the case where no leakage
is allowed. On the other hand, decreasing this parameter
drastically reduces the overhead of LPDB and even makes it
comparable to LPDB w/ Leakage in terms of communication
and computation. This means that in the case where only 1%
or less of DB entries have available channels, there is no need
to reveal one of the coordinates to reduce the overhead.
B. Location privacy
We compare our schemes to existing approaches in terms of
location privacy level by presenting the security problems on
which they rely as illustrated in Table III. We also precise the
localization probability of SU s under these schemes. The best
probability that could be achieved is 1/m, i.e. SU s are within
DB coverage area. If one of the schemes is broken then this
probability increases considerably.
TABLE III: Location privacy
Scheme Security level Localization probability
LPDB Unconditionally secure 1/m
LPDB w/ leakage Uncond. within 1 coordinate
√
1/m
PriSpectrum [23] Computational PIR 1/m
Troja et al [26] Computational PIR 1/m
Troja et al [25] Computational PIR 1/m
LPDBQS κ−HMAC 1/m
Zhang et al. [22] k-anonymity 1/k
Zhang et al. [27] Geo-Indistinguishability 1/r
Variables: r is the radius of the -geo-indistinguishability mechanism in [27].
LPDB offers unconditional security, as SU s do not share
any information that could reveal their location. LPDB could
be seen as a variant of PIR in which the server sends a whole
copy of the database to the user and this is the only way to
achieve information theoretic privacy (i.e. cannot be broken
even with computationally unbounded adversary) in a single-
server setting. Even if one of the coordinates is intentionally
revealed by a SU , its location is still indistinguishable from√
m− 1 remaining possible locations.
The approaches in [23], [25], [26] rely on computational
PIR protocols to preserve SU s’ location privacy. The security
of Computational PIR protocols’ is established against a com-
putationally bounded adversary based on well-known crypto-
graphic problems that are hard to solve (e.g. discrete logarithm
or factorization [43]). This means that these approaches offer
lower security level than LPDB .
The approach proposed by Zhang et al. [22] relies on the
concept of k-anonymity, which offers very low privacy level as
the probability of identifying the location of a querying SU is
equal to 1/k. Also, an approach cannot be proved to satisfy
k-anonymity unless assumptions are made about the attacker’s
auxiliary information. For instance, dummy locations are only
useful if they look equally likely to be the real location from
the adversary’s point of view. Any auxiliary information that
allows the attacker to rule out any of those locations would
immediately violate the definition.
As we have shown in Section VI, LPDBQS is as secure as
its underlying HMAC which is breakable only with probabil-
ity of 1/2κ, where κ is the security level. For the same security
level, HMAC incurs much less communication overhead than
that of the computational PIR protocols in [23], [25], [26].
Zhang et al. [27] propose an approach whose privacy
depends on the -geo-indistinguishability [28] mechanism,
which is derived from the differential privacy concept. In this
mechanism, a SU sends a randomly chosen point z close to
its location, but that still allows it to get a useful service.
An informal, definition of this mechanism as given in [28] is
as follows: A mechanism satisfies -geo-indistinguishability if
and only if for any radius r > 0, the user enjoys `-privacy
within a radius r, where ` = r and  is the privacy level
per unit of distance. A user is said to enjoy `-privacy within
r if, by observing z, the adversary’s ability to find the user’s
location among all points within r, does not increase by more
than a factor depending on ` compared to the case when z
is unknown [28]. The smaller ` the stronger the privacy the
user enjoys. SU can specify its privacy level requirement
by providing the radius r it is concerned about, and the
privacy level that it wishes for this specific radius. Relying
11
on this mechanism in the context of CRN , is problematic
because, first, it introduces some noise to SU ’s location which
may cause erroneous spectrum availability information and,
subsequently, interference with primary transmissions. Second,
to avoid facing the previous issue, SU may need to pick the
radius that can still give it accurate information which means
necessarily that r <<
√
m . Hence, even though the adversary
will be unable to pinpoint the exact location of the SU , it will
be able though to learn that it is within the radius r from the
the shared location z.
In summary, as can be seen in Table III and as explained
above, LPDB offers the highest location privacy level as
it achieves information-theoretic security. LPDBQS can of-
fer similar security guarantees as computational PIR-based
approaches but with significantly better computational and
communication overhead thanks to the use of HMAC .
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed two location privacy
preserving schemes, called LPDB and LPDBQS , that aim
to preserve the location privacy of SU s in database-driven
CRN s. They both use set membership data structures to
transmit a compact representation of the geo-location database
to either SU or QS , so that SU can query it to check whether
a specific channel is available in its vicinity. These schemes
require different architectural and performance tradeoffs.
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